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NOTES
THE DOCTRINE OF ILLEGALITY AND PETTY OFFENDERS:
CAN QUASI-CONTRACT BRING JUSTICE?
I. Introduction
It is well settled that a bargain will not be enforced if "either its formation
or its performance is criminal, tortious, or otherwise opposed to public policy."'
This "hands off" attitude toward illegal bargains2 is one of our most durable
common law doctrines. Not only has it withstood the test of judicial scrutiny
since time immemorial, but it has been endorsed by modern commentators as
fundamentally sound. Williston has declared that any other rule would be
"anomalous,"' while Corbin has praised the doctrine for its "salutary effect"
in causing obedience to the law.'
Common sense suggests that a doctrine with such ancient vintage and
impressive credentials should be immune from attack at this late date. However,
throughout its long history the doctrine has never been immune from challenge.
Its tendency to disproportionately penalize plaintiffs and unjustly enrich defen-
dants has caused noticeable traces of uneasiness among both judges and scholars.5
For example, Lord Mansfield applied the rule, but he did so with an apology
for its shortcomings:
The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff
and defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant.
1 1 MURPHY, CONTRACTS 559 (1963); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 512 (1932).
2 Corbin suggests that the term "illegal contract" contradicts itself, since by definition
a contract is legally enforceable. 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1373 (1962). However, most
courts have found it both harmless and convenient to use "illegal bargain" and "illegal
contract" interchangeably.
3 VI WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 4842 '(1938).
4 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS 716 (1962).
5 The Kansas Supreme Court has expressed this uneasiness by asking an almost un-
answerable question:
Why should one party to a contract be allowed to avoid the payment of debts he
has contracted to pay, and thus gain an unconscionable advantage, because the
other party deliberately, or through inability or mere oversight, has failed to discharge
an obligation to the city, when there is available to the city both a civil remedy for
the wrong and a penal remedy against the wrongdoer? Manker v. Tough, 79 Kan.
46, 53, 98 Pac. 792, 795 (1908).
Kentucky has also noted that the rule is not so universally valid as to deserve unthinking,
wooden application to every illegal bargain: "It is probable that a rule like this may, in some
instances, work a hardship by permitting one person to get the benefit of another person's
labor, service or property without compensation." Hays v. Providence Citizens' Bank & Trust
Go., 218 Ky. 128, 131, 290 S.W. 1028, 1029 (1927).
Likewise, a great number of other courts have expressed dissatisfaction with the rule as
applied to minor statutory violations. E.g., National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99 (1880);
McCullough Transfer Co. v. Virginia Sur. Co., 213 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1954); Dunlop v.
Mercer, 156 Fed. 545 (8th Cir. 1907); Ambro Advertising Agency v. Speed-Way Mfg. Co.,
211 Iowa 276, 233 N.W. 499 '(1930); Scott v. Apgar, 238 La. 29, 113 So. 2d 457 (1959);
Fosdick v. Investors Syndicate, 266 N.Y. 130, 194 N.E. 58 (1934); Uhlmann v. Kin Daw,
97 Or. 681, 193 Pac. 435 (1920); Chapman v. Zakzaska, 273 Wis.64, 76 N.W.2d 537 (1956).
However, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, all these courts apply the
doctrine to minor regulatory violations as well as to major penal offenses. E.g., Howard v.
Lebby, 197 Ky. 324, 246 S.W. 828 (1923); Van Horn v. Vining, 133 So. 2d 901 (La. App.
1961); Spivak v. Sachs, 16 N.Y.2d 163, 211 N.E.2d 329, 263 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965).
It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it
is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the
advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the
plaintiff, by accident, if I may so say.6
Certain scholars have been less tolerant of the doctrine's failings. In 1891
Wigmore launched the most notable attack on the doctrine:
[Tjhe whole notion is radically wrong in principle and produces extreme
injustice. If A owes B $5,000 why should he not pay it whether B has
violated a statute or not? Where the issue is as to the rights of two litigants,
it is unscientific to impose a penalty incidentally by depriving one of the
litigants of his admitted right.... If there is one part of criminal juris-
prudence which needs even more careful attention than it now receives
it is the apportionment of penalty to offense. Yet the doctrine now under
consideration requires, with monstrous injustice and blind haphazard, that
the plaintiff shall be mulcted in the amount of his right, whatever that may
be.... [A] fine of thousands of dollars may be imposed for petty violations
of the law. One cannot imagine why we have so long allowed such an
unworthy principle to remain.7
Wigmore's attack is difficult to parry. The doctrine of illegality is undeniably
a clumsy method of punishing wrongdoers, and it reaches a pinnacle of clumsi-
ness when applied to a plaintiff whose only "wrong" is that he violated a minor
regulatory statute. As Corbin has noted, such a petty offender has often "ren-
dered excellent service or delivered goods of the highest quality, his noncom-
pliance with the statute seems nearly harmless, and the real defrauder seems
to be the defendant who is enriching himself at the plaintiff's expense.""
Wigrnore suggested that the courts remedy this injustice by enforcing all
contracts, while deducting a reasonable penalty proportioned to the plaintiff's
offense.9 This suggestion has been ignored by the courts, probably because it
represents such a radical break from traditional common law methods.'0 How-
ever, if Wignore's proposed cure was ill-advised, it should not obscure the
validity of his criticism. Nonenforcement is a poor method of punishing petty
offenders. An alternative is badly needed. If Wigmore's cure is too drastic,
the courts must find an adequate, less drastic, solution.
Unfortunately, however, judicial attempts at remedying the doctrine's
defects have been patently ineffective. The purpose of this note is to explore the
deficiencies of these efforts and to analyze quasi-contractual relief as a possible
cure for the doctrine's obvious defects.
II. Scope
This note is confined to contracts whose formation or performance violates
a legislative mandate. Adhesion contracts, contracts in restraint of trade, or
other contracts violative of judge-made law are not considered. Instead,
6 Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1775).
7 Wigmore, A Summary of Quasi-Contracts, 25 Am. L. REv. 695, 712-13 n.k '(1891).
8 6A CoRBIN, CONTRACTs 713 (1962).
9 Wigmore, A Summary of Quasi-Contracts, 25 AM. L. REv. 695, 712-13 n.k (1891).
10 CHAFER, SOME PROBLEMS OF Egurry 38 (1950).
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this note concentrates on statutory violations, because it is in this area that
the doctrine of illegality is rigid, unbending, and productive of harsh results.
Once the courts ascertain that a contract conflicts with a statute, they refuse to
enforce it almost as a matter of course." As a result of this rigid policy, statutory
offenders suffer the injustice of being punished twice - once by the legislature
and once by the courts. 2
Nonstatutory illegality has been excluded from the present analysis because,
unlike statutory illegality, it is not plagued with the problems of inflexibility
and double punishment. While judicially construing illegality, the courts tend
to engage in a delicate balancing of all the interests involved. Nonenforcement
does not rest on a mechanistic determination that the contract is in conflict
with a statute, but on a carefully considered judgment that the contract is too
harsh and unconscionable to be enforced. 3 More importantly, nonenforcement
is the only penalty imposed, since the legislature has not enacted a punishment
of its own.
Statutory violations will be approached by separating them into two sub-
classes: violations which involve moral turpitude (Part III below) and viola-
tions which do not (Part IV below). This division is made because the doctrine
of illegality should treat petty offenders less severely than it does underworld
characters. It could be argued that any distinction resting on "moral turpitude"
would be too uncertain to yield reasonably predictable results. However, as the
Supreme Court noted in Morissette v. United States,'4 the entire history of the
common law suggests that such a distinction is possible:
[Ojourts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different offenses,
have devised working formulae, if not scientific ones, for the instruction of
juries around such terms as "felonious intent, .... criminal intent," "malice
aforethought," "guilty knowledge," "fraudulent intent," "wilfulness,"
"scienter," to denote guilty knowledge, or "mens rea," to signify an evil
purpose or mental culpability. 15
11 This attitude is typified by the rule laid down by the California Supreme Court in
Smith v. Bach: "A statute . . . prohibiting the making of contracts, except in a certain
manner, ipso facto makes them void if made in any other way." 183 Cal. 259, 262, 191 Pac.
14, 15 (1920).
The following cases further illustrate this rigid approach to statutory violations: Southern
Metal Treating Co. v. Goodner, 271 Ala. 510, 125 So. 2d 268 (1960); Van Horn v. Vining,
133 So. 2d 901 '(La. App. 1961); Bacigalupo v. Fleming, 199 Va. 827, 102 S.E.2d 321 (1958).
12 A few courts have recognized the dangers of cumulative penalties, for example:
The purpose of the [statutory] penalty is to secure obedience to the statute to the
end that its object may be accomplished. But the object of the statute, as above
stated, is certainly not accomplished or even furthered by adding to the penalty
expressly imposed the additional one of the loss of goods, chattels, or services sold or
performed by one doing business in violation of the statute. Such a cumulative
penal result is scarcely commensurate with the evil sought to be remedied. Hayes v.
Providence Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 218 Ky. 128, 133, 290 S.W. 1028, 1029-30
(1927).
However, like other states which have occasionally denounced the doctrine, Kentucky continues
to apply it to most situations. Kentucky's adherence to the general rule is apparent in Tussey
v. Felty, 206 Ky. 506, 267 S.W. 765 (1924). Other states have questioned the rule, yet con-
tinue to apply it. See the text accompanying note 5 supra.
13 E.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1948); Sandier v. Common-
wealth Station Co., 307 Mass. 470, 30 N.E.2d 389 (1940); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234
(1953).
14 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
15 Id. at 252.
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If such formulae are workable in other areas of the law, they should be work-
able in the area of illegality.
III. Statutory Violations Involving Moral Turpitude,
Without exception, the courts do not enforce bargains which violate major
penal statutes. This 'policy of nonenforcement was first announced by Lord
Holt in Bartlett v. Vinor," an English case decided in 1693:
[E]very contract made for or about any matter or thing which is prohibited
and made unlawful by any statute, is a void contract, tho' the statute it self
doth not mention that it shall be so, but only inflicts a penalty on the
offender, because a penalty implies a prohibition, tho' there are no pro-
hibitory words in the statute.17
This rule is correct when applied to statutory violations involving moral turpi-
tude, though its basis does not appear to be legislative intent, as Lord Holt seems
to have suggested. The basic fallacy in Lord Holt's theory is that "the legisla-
ture, when adopting a penal statute, has rarely had in mind the problems of
contract law that may later arise."' 8 When the lawmakers have given no
thought to a problem, legislative intent does not exist.
In reality, the rationale of nonenforcement is purely a judicial creation,
grounded in the hope that it will deter violations of the law, and in the fear
that any other policy would damage the dignity of the courts.'" The validity
of the doctrine of illegality rests, not upon the presence or absence of legislative
intent, but upon the validity or invalidity of these two underlying policies. Thus,
in every case the court must face two difficult questions: 1) Will nonenforce-
ment deter violation of the law? 2) Will enforcement damage the dignity of
the court? If the answer to both of these questions is in the negative, the con-
tract should be enforced without hesitation.
Does nonenforcement of illegal bargains deter violations of the criminal law?
When serious crimes are involved, the answer is, never. If a man is not deterred
by the prospect of several years in a lonely cell, he will not be discouraged by
a court's refusal to enforce his illegal bargain. Furthermore, more serious of-
fenders seldom rely on judicial sanctions to keep their internal affairs in order.
They have other, less public, ways of enforcing their agreements.
Quite clearly, the dignity of a court would be impaired if it enforced a
serious, criminal contract. This is illustrated by a case recently reported by News-
week Magazine:
The crocodile man had a fixed price for chewing up a victim. It was
90 shillings ($12.60), payable on completion of the job.
This seemed reasonable to 33-year-old Odrick Kanshoche, a villager
inhabiting the swamps along the Shire River in the British African
dependency of Nyasaland, for he thought he was haunted by the witchcraft
16 Carth. 251, 90 Eng. Rep. 750 '(1693).
17 Id. at 252, 90 Eng. Rep. at 750.
18 Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. Rnv. 679, 682 (1935).
19 Wade, Benefits Obtained Under Illegal Transactions-Reasons for and Against Allow-
ing Restitution, 25 TExAs L. Rav. 31, 59 (1946).
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of an 8-year-old girl named Ponda Cement. So he hired the crocodile man.
The crocodile man, 35-year-old Ellard Chipandare, performed his
usual incantations, slipped into a crocodile skin, and began drifting
down the Shire toward the spot where the girl was getting water. When
her mutilated body was found, the authorities assumed a real crocodile
had attacked her. They listed it as "death by misadventure."
They didn't learn otherwise until Odrick reneged on his payments.
He said that all he could pay was 10 shillings down and the rest "later,"
on the monthly installment plan.
The crocodile man didn't approve of the installment plan, however.
So he went to court and sued for his money.
At the hearing before the Chikwawa Native Authority Court, Odrick
defended himself by telling the judge, Chief Chapananga, that he had
ordered not one but two "crocodile rituals," for there was another girl
who also haunted him. Therefore, he said, the crocodile man hadn't
completed his part of the deal and hadn't any legal claim.
Judge Chapananga ruled in favor of the crocodile man, however. He
ordered Odrick to pay 50 shillings ($7) for the completed half of the bargain.
It was a perfectly understandable decision and the court had full legal
jurisdiction over a civil case on nonpayment of debt, said a British police
officer. After waiting until native justice had been carried out, Her
Majesty's representative last week arrested both the crocodile man and
his client on charges of murder.
2 0
This result is obviously wrong, but not because the court has passed up an op-
portunity to deter future crimes. Indeed, it appears that the policy of keeping
the courts open to criminals was of great assistance in bringing two dangerous
men to justice. The distasteful aspect of the crocodile case is that the court
appeared to approve the conduct of the parties by giving them precise and
solicitous justice. It was beneath the dignity of the court to abjectly cooperate
with the parties in picking up the pieces of their outrageous bargain. The parties
should have been turned away in symbolic rejection of their evil transaction.2 '
This theory of rejection is subject to a crucial limitation. The courts should
never drive a plaintiff away from the seat of justice when ordinary men would
not consider him guilty of serious wrongdoing. As has been noted in a related
context, "to inflict substantial punishment upon one who is morally entirely
innocent, who caused injury through reasonable mistake or pure accident, would
so outrage the feelings of the community as to nullify its own enforcement."2
Moral turpitude is the key. Courts will not gain respect by punishing morally
innocent men,23 though in some contexts the theory of deterrence may justify
nonenforcement of executory bargains, even when the parties are morally
innocent.
20 Newsweek, September 10, 1962, p. 54.
21 "The real objection is not to one man's clean hands, but to the whole enterprise. The
court does not want to touch an unlawful transaction with a ten-foot pole." CHAF"BE, Op. Cit.
supra note 10, at 31. For a thorough analysis see Wade, Benefits Obtained Under Illegal
Transactions-Reasons for and Against Allowing Restitution, 25 TEXAs L. REv. 31 (1946).
22 Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUm. L. REv. 55, 56 (1933).
23 As Justice Holmes noted, "even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and
being kicked." HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881).
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IV. Statutory Violations Not Involving Moral Turpitude
Traditionally, there could be "no crime large or small without an evil
mind." However, the past century has witnessed the growth of a distinct group
of statutory offenses punishable without the traditional requirement of moral
turpitude.25 As these statutes have mushroomed in importance, increasing num-
bers of morally innocent, petty offenders have been denied enforcement of their
contracts. The remainder of this note will concentrate on these petty offenders
to determine whether justice demands that the doctrine of illegality be modified
to allow limited enforcement of their illegal bargains.
Petty offenders usually become entangled in the doctrine of illegality by
violating an occupational licensing statute. These guild-type statutes make it
unlawful for persons to engage in certain occupations without first receiving
a license from the state.2" Originally confined to the professions, these restrictive
laws have lately spread to common occupations and affected the validity of a
wide variety of contracts." Like most regulatory measures, occupational licensing
statutes fix their own penalty. Their violation is usually a misdemeanor punish-
able by fine and/or imprisonment, leaving discretion in the trial judge to impose
the appropriate sanction.28 Occasionally, a statute will also require the for-
feiture of conflicting contract rights. Of course, in such cases the courts can
only obey the legislative fiat.29
Express forfeitures are rarely enacted." Furthermore, as in the case of
penal statutes, there are usually no indications of legislative desire to make
regulatory measures destructive of conflicting contract rights."1 As a result,
the courts have been forced to decide whether it is possible to enforce contracts
violative of regulatory measures without diluting the statutory penalties and de-
priving the public of the benefits of regulation.
The search for a just and viable method of enforcing these malum pro-
hibitum contracts has been a frustrating one. Not only are the courts in con-
flict as to which rule should be applied and when, but very often the decisions
within a single jurisdiction are hopelessly at odds.2 The following rules have
24 Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLuM. L. REV. 55 (1933).
25 Gellhorn, Occupational Licensing-A Nationwide Dilemma, 109 J. ACcOUNTANCY 39
(1960).
26 For a thorough discussion of the many problems created by occupational licensing see
GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS '(1956).
27 Gellhorn, Occupational Licensing-A Nationwide Dilemma, 109 J. AcCOUNTA cY 39, 40
(1960).
28 See the following cases and the statutes cited therein: Hall v. Bowman, 88 Ariz. 409,
357 P.2d 149 (1960); Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal.2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 '(1957).
29 Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal.2d 141, 151, 308 P.2d 713, 719 (1957).
30 6A CoRniN, CONTRAcTS 714 (1962).
31 Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUm. L. REv. 679, 682 (1935).
32 Focusing on one jurisdiction, three rules coexist in California: (1) "A statute . . .
prohibiting the making of contracts, except in a certain manner, ipso facto makes them void
if made in any other way." Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 262, 191 Pac. 14, 15 (1920); '(2)
A contract will be enforced if "the forefeiture resulting from unenforceability is dispropor-
tionately harsh considering the nature of the illegality." Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48
Cal.2d 141, 151, 308 P.2d 713, 719 (1957) (dictum); (3) "Where, as here, the alleged
illegal transaction has been terminated, public policy is not served or public policy protected by
denying one party to the contract relief against the other." Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal. App.
2d 472, 482, 267 P.2d 59, 66 (1954).
The law in the state of Washington is also confused, for the supreme court has applied
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been applied by various courts at various times: penalty implies prohibition;3
penalty is prima facie evidence of prohibition;34 penalty implies prohibition ex-
cept when "disproportionate hardship" would result;"5 penalty implies exclusion
of extrastatutory punishment;3" and penalty prohibits contractual relief, but
allows recovery in quasi-contract for benefits conferred. 7
A. Penalty Implies Prohibition
The courts generally apply Lord Holt's rigid dictum to all statutory viola-
tions without regard to the degree of illegality involved:
The general rule controlling in cases of this character is that where a statute
prohibits or attaches a penalty to the doing of an act, the act is void, and
this, notwithstanding that the statute does not expressly pronounce it so, and
it is immaterial whether the thing forbidden is malum in se or merely malum
prohibitum .... The imposition by statute of a penalty implies a prohibition
two rules without adequately distinguishing them: (1) A contract violative of a police power
regulation will not be enforced, although a severable, legal part of it will be. Lund v. Bruflat,
159 Wash. 89, 292 Pac. 112 (1930). (2) "It is a general proposition, sustained by the
weight of authority, that where a statute imposes a penalty for failure to comply with statutory
requirements, the penalty so provided is exclusive of any other." Way v. Pacific Lumber &
Timber Co., 74 Wash. 332, 334, 133 Pac. 595 (1913).
The law of illegality in New York is so fragmented that the courts have a wide choice
with regard to regulatory violations - something which is convenient for the courts but
exasperating for lawyers and clients: (1) "This was an illegal transaction and under our
settled rules we refuse to aid in it but leave the parties where they are." Spivak v. Sachs, 16
N.Y.2d 163, 168, 211 N.E.2d 329, 331, 263 N.Y.S.2d 953, 957 (1965); (2) Champertous
agreements, although illegal, are enforceable in quasi-contract. Harvey v. F.W. Dodge Corp.,
169 Misc. 781, 8 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1938); (3) "If the statute does not provide expressly that
its violation will deprive the parties of their right to sue on the contract, and the denial of
relief is wholly out of proportion to the requirements of public policy or appropriate individual
punishment, the right to recover will not be denied." Rosasco Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen,
276 N.Y. 274, 278, 11 N.E.2d 908, 909 (1937) (partial basis); (4) "[W]here the wrong com-
mitted by the violation of the statute is merely malum prohibitum, and does not endanger
health or morals, such additional punishment should not be imposed unless the legislative intent
is expressed or appears by clear implication." Rosasco Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen, 276 N.Y.
274, 280, 11 N.E.2d 908, 910 (1937) (partial basis).
33 The leading case is Bartlett v. Vinor, Carth 251, 90 Eng. Rep. 750 (1693). Other
cases are: Southern Metal Treating Co. v. Goodner, 271 Ala. 510, 125 So. 2d 268 (1960);
Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 191 Pac. 14 (1920); Van Horn v. Vining, 133 So. 2d 901(La. App. 1961); Spivak v. Sachs, 16 N.Y.2d 163, 211 N.E.2d 329, 263 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965);
Cope v. Rowlands, 2 M. & W. 149, 150 Eng. Rep. 707 '(1836).
34 E.g., McLamb v. Phillips, 34 Ga. App. 210, 129 S.E. 570 (1925); Beecher v. Peru
Trust Co., 49 Ind. App. 184, 97 N.E. 23 (1912); Howard v. Lebby, 197 Ky. 324, 246
S.W. 828 (1923); William Coltin & Co. v. Manchester Say. Bank, 105 N.H. 254, 197 A.2d
208 (1964); Bacigalupo v. Fleming, 199 Va. 827, 102 S.E.2d 321 (1958).
35 Rosasco Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen, 276 N.Y. 274, 11 N.E.2d 908 (1937) (partial basis).
Other cases include Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal.2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 '(1957)(dictum); Schloss v. Davis, 213 Md. 119, 131 A.2d 287 (1957); Wallach v. Katzonwitz, 171
Misc. 287, 12 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1939).
36 The leading case is Rosasco Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen, 276 N.Y. 274, 11 N.E.2d 908(1937) (partial basis). Others include Macco Constr. Co. v. Farr, 137 F.2d 52 (9th Cir.
1943); Dunlop v. Mercer, 156 Fed. 545 (8th Cir. 1907); In Re Johnson, 224 Fed. 180 (W.D.
Wash. 1915); Sajor v. Ampol, Inc., 275 N.Y. 125, 9 N.E.2d 803 (1937); Way v. Pacific
Lumber & Timber Co., 74 Wash. 332, 133 Pac. 595 (1913).
37 Outside the area of champertous agreements, where a majority of courts allow quasi-
contractual recovery, the decisions favoring this rule are largely limited to California: Nichols
v. Boswell-Alliance Constr. Corp., 181 Cal. App.2d 584, 5 Cal. Rptr. 546 (Dist. Ct. App.
1960); Wilson v. Steams, 123 Cal. App.2d 472, 267 P.2d 59 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Norwood
v. Judd, 93 Cal. App.2d 276, 209 P.2d 24 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
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of the act to which the penalty is attached, and a contract founded upon such
act is void. 38
Many courts defend this rigid attitude toward petty offenders by invoking
Lord,.Holt's old pretense that the legislature intended the forfeiture of all con-
tractual rights conflicting with legislative enactments. 9 Other courts, apparently
recognizing that the doctrine of illegality is a judicial and not a legislative
creation, have attempted to justify their decisions on more realistic grounds. The
most substantialjustification offered by these courts is that enforcement of malum
prohibitum bargains would dilute statutory penalties and encourage regulatory
violations.40 This argument cannot be rebutted by saying that petty offenders
would not use the courts even if the doors of justice were open to them. Unlike
traditional criminals, such petty offenders often have much to gain and little
to lose by taking their contracts to court.41
Yet, even in the area of minor violations, nonenforcement has a limited
deterrent effect. Nonenforcement is a cumulative punishment imposed by the
courts in addition to the regular statutory penalty. Thus, whenever the statutory
deterrent is sufficient standing by itself, nonenforcement serves no positive function.
Rather, it serves only the negative function of preventing contract damages from
diluting the statutory deterrent. The evil of contract damages is that petty of-
fenders are reimbursed for the loss of anticipated profits. Such profits can be used
to pay statutory fines as a "cost of doing business." By eliminating this profit
element, nonenforcement allows statutory fines to operate with full impact upon
offenders.
The negative function of nonenforcement is most efficient when applied
to illegal bargains which are purely executory. Since the plaintiff has suffered
no out-of-the-pocket damages, an award would consist entirely of anticipated
profits; thus, the statutory penalty would almost certainly be nullified by en-
forcement. Furthermore, there are no conflicting policies to be considered be-
cause the twin dangers of unjust enrichment and disproportionate penalty are
nonexistent. Since neither party has performed, the status quo can be main-
tained with no loss but that of the bargain.42 However, the deterrent theory breaks
down when applied to contracts which are partially or wholly executed. Since
the plaintiff has rendered valuable performance, nonenforcement not only pre-
38 Contractor's Safety Ass'n v. California Compensation Ins. Co., 48 Cal.2d 71, 76, 307
P.2d 626, 629 '(1957).
39 E.g., Knight v. Watson, 221 Ala. 69, 127 So. 841 (1930); Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal.
259, 191 Pac. 14 (1920); Van Horn v. Vining, 133 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 1961).
40 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated the argument in these terms:
There is no force to plaintiff's contention that the penalties imposed by these
statutes are intended to be the sole punishment for infractions thereof. If the courts
were to enforce such unlawful contracts the relatively small fines to which violators of
the law are made subject would be insufficient to discourage repeated violations. F.F.
Bollinger Co. v. Widmann Brewing Corp., 339 Pa. 289, 294, 14 A.2d 81, 84 (1940).
The statute in Bollinger punished violators by fine alone. The dilution argument would seem
to be less valid as applied to the vast majority of regulatory measures, which provide for fine
and/or imprisonment. The prospect of a thirty-day jail term is probably enough to deter
most businessmen, even if a tidy profit is possible and the contract is judicially enforceable.
Compare the text accompanying notes 5 and 12 supra.
41 Even though the hope of recovery is nil, there are a vast number of petty offender
cases in the reports.
42 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTs 817 (1962).
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vents him from realizing anticipated profits but also from recovering out-of-
the-pocket expenses. It is this denial of actual damages that Wigmore so
vehemently complained of.4 The doctrine of illegality should be limited to its
negative function of preventing the dilution of statutory penalties and should
never impose extrastatutory penalties which result in harshness and injustice
without significant deterrent effect.
The doctrine of quasi-contract could be of great service once contracts
have been executed. By denying recovery for anticipated profits while reimbursing
the plaintiff for his out-of-the-pocket expenses, quasi-contract would eliminate
the problems of disproportionate penalty and unjust enrichment without diluting
statutory penalties. The courts, however, have been slow to grant quasi-con-
tractual relief in this area." They have preferred to grant total relief or deny
it completely.
B. Penalty is Prima Facie Prohibition
The courts have developed a number of limited devices for granting total
relief to petty offenders. The most common attempts to introduce an element
of flexibility into the general rule by replacing Lord Holt's conclusive pre-
sumption with a rebuttable presumption of nonenforceability." The courts fol-
lowing this rule hold that a statutory penalty does not debar them from at-
tempting to discover whether the legislature actually intended to destroy con-
flicting contract rights. The extent of additional inquiry a court is willing to
undertake varies considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Most will in-
quire far enough to discover whether the statute is a revenue measure or a police
power regulation, since it is presumed that the legislature would not intend
to destroy contractual rights with tax statutes." William Coltin & Co. v. Man-
chester Say. Bank4e 7 contains a good statement of the revenue measure exception:
If all the relevent factors indicate the purpose of such a statute is the
collection of revenue, the express statutory penalties are usually held to be
exclusive and contracts made without a license are not thereby made un-
enforceable. If on the other hand the statute is an exercise of the police
power and is designed to protect the public against fraud and incompetence,
the lack of license will not only subject a violator to the express statutory
penalty but he will be unable to enforce his bargain and collect his
commission.48
In addition to the narrow revenue measure exception, many courts have
adopted a broader legislative intent exception, which is best stated in this oft-
quoted passage:
The rule that a contract is invalid if it conflicts with a statute is not an
43 See note 7 supra.
44 See note 37 supra.
45 VI WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1763, at 5004 (1938).
46 E.g., Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, 27 Cal.2d 687, 166 P.2d 265 "(1946); Turner
v. Schmidt Brewing Co., 278 Mich. 464, 270 N.W. 750 (1936); William Coltin & Co. v.
Manchester Say. Bank, 105 N.H. 254, 197 A.2d 208 (1964); Bacigalupo v. Fleming, 199
Va. 827, 102 S.E.2d 321 (1958).
47 105 N.H. 254, 197 A.2d 208 (1964).
48 Id. at 256, 197 A.2d at 210.
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inflexible one. The true rule seems to be that the question is one of legislative
intent.... The courts will always look to the language of the statute, the
subject matter, the wrong or evil which it seeks to remedy or prevent,
and the purpose sought in its enactment, and, if from all these it is manifest
that it was not intended to imply a prohibition or to render the prohibited
act void, the courts will so hold and construe the statute accordingly.49
Although broad in its terms, this exception is narrow in practice, because it
places the burden of persuasion on the party seeking ,to enforce the bargain.
Since legislative intent is virtually nonexistent in this area, such a burden is
impossible to sustain. In effect, the exception is limited to regulatory statutes
which are so petty that nonenforcement of conflicting bargains would be absurd.
For example, when an opportunistic customer refuses to pay his just debt to
a "Hardware Hank Store" on the ground that its owner has not filed under
the state's Fictional Name Statute.5" No court would accept such an argument,
since it would impose too stringent a penalty for a very petty breach of the law."1
C. Exception for "Disproportionate Hardship"
In Rosasco Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen" the New York Court of Appeals
refused to apply the doctrine of illegality to a bargain which violated the state's
Milk Control Law. The court did so, partially on the grounds that since sub-
stantial and valuable performance had been rendered under the contract, a
denial of relief would be "wholly out of proportion to the requirements of public
policy or appropriate individual punishment. .... "" Corbin has praised this
exception as allowing continued maintenance of the general rule of nonenforce-
n)ent, "while still permitting the court[s] to consider the merits of the particular
case and to avoid unreasonable penalties and forfeitures."5 4 However, the rule
is frightfully uncertain and subjective in its application. In addition, it suffers
because it grants contractual, rather than quasi-contractual relief. The courts,
apparently feeling that a widespread allowance of contractual relief would dilute
statutory deterrents, have limited the exception to disproportionate hardships of
an extraordinary nature.55 This niggardly application of the exception has done
49 C.J.S. Contracts § 201 (1963). The leading case is Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. 79(1851). Other significant cases include Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa 546 (1873); Uhlmann
v. Kin Daw, 97 Or. 681, 193 Pac. 435 (1920); Chapman v. Zakzaska, 273 Wis. 64, 76
N.W.2d 537 '(1956).
50 Such statutes make it unlawful to carry on a business under a trade name other than
the true surname of the owner. The purpose of these statutes is to prevent frauds upon
consumers, but a great many innocent businessmen inadvertently fail to comply with the
statutory requirements. Many cases applying the legislative intent exception have involved
these Fictional Name Statutes. For example: Ambro Advertising Agency v. Speed-Way Mfg.
Co., 211 Iowa 276, 233 N.W. 499 (1930); Hayes v. Providence Citizens' Bank & Trust Co.,
218 Ky. 128, 290 S.W. 1028 (1927); Huey v. Passarelli, 267 Mass. 578, 166 N.E. 727 (1929).
51 But see Colbert v. Ashland Constr. Co., 176 Va. 500, 11 S.E.2d 612 (1940), citing
IRESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 580, comment a (1932):
The legislature can prohibit the formation of any bargain and thereby make
it illegal. The question whether the legislature has done so depends on the interpreta-
tion of the legislative action. In case of express prohibition or of declaring the act
a crime there can be no doubt. 176 Va. 500, 503, 11 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1940).
52 276 N.Y. 274, 11 N.E.2d 908 '(1937).
53 Id. at 278, 11 N.E.2d at 909.
54 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS 716 (1962).
55 Since nonenforcement is always a double penalty when applied to regulatory measures,
it would seem that an unnecessary hardship results whenever the courts refuse to grant
recovery for valuable benefits conferred.
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little to remedy the ordinary injustices which inevitably result from denying relief
to petty offenders.
D. Penalty Implies Exclusion
In 1943 the Ninth Circuit thought it detected a trend toward the complete
rejection of Lord Holt's prohibition rule when petty offenders were involved:
A considerable number of recent cases have held that where the violation
of a licensing statute is merely malum prohibitum and does not endanger
the public health or morals and where penalties for non-compliance are
specifically set forth and no declaration that a contract in relation thereto
is void or its enforcement prohibited, such additional punishment should
not be imposed unless the legislative intent is expressed or appears by clear
implication. 58
If there were ever such a trend, it suffered an early death. The doctrine was
too broad, for it would have allowed petty offenders to enforce executory, as
well as executed contracts. Undoubtedly this explains why only a few scattered
courts have applied the rule of expressio unis exclusio alterius, and then only in
unusual circumstances.5"
The reasoning in these cases is of some interest, for it displays the futility
of pursuing the will-o'-the-wisp of legislative intent. These courts disagree with
Lord Holt simply because they read the legislative mind differently: "If such
[prohibition] was the intent of the legislature it could easily have said so in
express words."58 This presumption of an exclusion is certainly as reasonable as
Lord Holt's presumption of a prohibition; indeed, if legislative silence means
anything, it probably means that the courts should not impose additional
penalties.
E. Quasi-Contractual Recovery
The courts have been extremely reluctant to make exception to the strict
doctrine of illegality by granting quasi-contractual relief.5 9 Some of this reluctance
probably springs from Lord Mansfield's refusal to apply his own remedy to
illegal bargains.6" However, most of it results from the tendency of the courts
to favor simple answers which are capable of being inferred from legislative
silence. Silence must mean either a flat no, or an uncompromising yes - it can
never imply a carefully qualified yes. Thus, without some positive indication of
intent, it is difficult to infer a legislative policy of recovery in quasi-contract,
though not in contract. Such a limited recovery will be possible only when the
56 Macco Constr. Co. v. Farr, 137 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir. 1943).
57 The real basis for these decisions is probably "disproportionate hardship." Indeed,
Macco relied heavily upon Rosasco Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen, 276 N.Y. 274, 11 N.E.2d
908 (1937), which later cases have read as turning on the "disproportionate hardship" theory.
For cases and materials reading Rosasco in this narrower sense see Lewis & Queen v. N.M.
Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957) (dictum); Wallach v. Katzonwitz, 171 Misc.
287, 12 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1939), and 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1512, at 716 (1962).
58 McCullough Transfer Co. v. Virginia Sur. Co., 213 F.2d 440, 442 (6th Cir. 1954).
59 Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through Illegal Transactions, 95 U. PA. L. REv.
261 (1947). Cf., 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1535-36 (1962).
60 Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1775).
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courts abandon the myth of legislative intent and treat the policy of non-
enforcement like the judge-made doctrine that it is.
Encouragement can be derived from recent California cases, which appear to
be moving, however hesitantly, toward allowing quasi-contractual recovery for
benefits conferred under illegal bargains. In the leading case of Norwood v.
Judd,' a member of an unlicensed partnership sued for dissolution and an ac-
counting of proceeds. Although the licensing statute specifically called for for-
feiture of contractual rights, the supreme court found that the defending partner
was not a member of the class protected by the statute. It then cast aside the
old "penalty implies prohibition" rule:
The rule that the courts will not lend their aid to the enforcement of an
illegal agreement or one against public policy is fundamentally sound. The
rule was conceived for the purposes of protecting the public and the courts
from imposition. It is a rule predicated upon sound public policy. But
the courts should not be so enamored with the Latin phrase "in pan
delicto" that they blindly extend the rule to every case where illegality ap-
pears somewhere in the transaction. The fundamental purpose of the rule
must always be kept in mind, and the realities of the situation must be
considered. Where, by applying the rule, the public cannot be protected
because the transaction has been completed, where no serious moral
turpitude is involved, where the defendant is the one guilty of the greatest
moral fault, and where to apply the rule will be to permit the defendant to
be unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff, the rule should not be
applied.6 2
Norwood is significant because it ignores legislative intent, analyzing instead
the policies supporting the doctrine of illegality. This enlightened approach was
followed by a lower California court in Wilson v. Stearns,6" which extended
Norwood beyond the accounting for profits situation. The case involved a police
power regulation which prohibited brokers from procuring exclusive employment
agreements not having a definite termination date. The court allowed recovery
for the more than $17,000 sued for; apparently on a quantum meruit basis:
Where, as here, the alleged illegal transaction has been terminated' public
policy is not served or public policy protected by denying one party to the
contract relief against the other., Rather than permit the unjust enrichment
of respondent George Steams, we are disposed to apply the rule announced
in the case of Norwood v. Judd.6"
Unfortunately, the Norwood-Wilson doctrine appears to have been limited
by the California Supreme Court in the more recent case of Lewis & Queen v.
N. M. Ball Sons. 5 The court implied that the rule of illegality allows recovery
only when nonenforcement would result in unreasonable and disproportionate
forfeitures or other penalties. This implication was strengthened by the citation of
Wilson v. Stearns in support of the disproportionate penalties doctrine.6
61 93 Cal. App.2d 276, 209 P.2d 24 (1949).
62 Id. at 288-89, 209 P.2d at 31.
63 123 Cal. App.2d 472, 267 P.2d 59 (1954).
64 Id. at 482, 267 P.2d at 66.
65 48 Cal.2d 141, 308 P.2d 713 (1957).
66 Id. at 141, 308 P.2d at 719.
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The status of quasi-contract in California is not yet clear. At least one
lower court decision since Lewis & Queen has refused to accept its implied limi-
tation of the Norwood-Wilson approach." In a case almost identical to Wilson
but involving no disproportionate penalty, a district court read Lewis & Queen
as approving the Norwood doctrine and Wilson's extension of it.6 Thus, it ap-
pears that the California Supreme Court will have at least one more opportunity
to reconsider its traditional approach.
V. Conclusion
Almost no one quarrels with the doctrine of illegality as applied to major
criminal offenders. Since moral turpitude is involved, nonenforcement serves
as an apt symbol of rejection and causes no unjust enrichment or disproportionate
penalty. Nor does anyone quarrel with the doctrine when it is applied to the
executory contracts of petty offenders. Since no performance has been rendered
under the contract, nonenforcement only prevents the plaintiff from realizing
anticipated profits; it cannot cause him out-of-pocket losses. However, the doc-
trine is unacceptable when it is applied to petty offenders who have rendered
performance under a contract. True, nonenforcement in this situation may
again prevent the dilution of statutory penalties by eliminating anticipated
profits, but it does so at the cost of imposing a double penalty on the plaintiff
and allowing the defendant to benefit from goods or services which do not
rightly belong to him.
Quasi-contractual relief could eliminate the injustice of double punishment
without impairing the effectiveness of statutory deterrents. Under this flexible
remedy, the jury could be instructed to award the plaintiff an amount which would
represent the reasonable value of goods delivered or services rendered, while
excluding all profit from the transaction. Naturally, if the performance was de-
fective, the plaintiff's recovery would be reduced accordingly. Also, all doubts
as to the proper amount of recovery would be resolved in favor of the defendant.
In this manner, justice would be done between the litigating parties, and the
statutory penalty would be imposed upon the plaintiff without impairment.
Both justice and statutory policy would be preserved.
1. Gregory Walta
67 Nichols v. Boswell-Alliance Constr. Corp., 181 Cal. App.2d 584, 5 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1960).
68 Id. at 287-89, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 547-50.
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